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ABSTRACT  
After a period of sequential economic adjustment programmes, recent data show that wages remain 
irresponsive to local labour market conditions in Greece. Although there is evidence of a weak cross-
sectional wage curve, it disappears when individual fixed effects are introduced. Despite the 
extensive labour market reforms, more emphasis to the decentralisation of the wage setting process 
is needed. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between wages and unemployment has been extensively studied, both 
theoretically and empirically. One of the strongest empirical regularities is the wage curve, 
i.e. the negative relationship between individual wages and local unemployment rates 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), that predicts a 1 percent fall in the level of wages if local 
unemployment rises by 10 percent, ceteris paribus. Efficiency wage and bargaining theory 
models have been proposed to explain this inverse relationship.  
However, the level of wage flexibility in a country is also a function of its labour market 
institutions (Freeman and Nickell, 1988). Greece has been a heavily regulated economy with 
allocative inefficiency and limited capacity to absorb external shocks. Since 2010, several 
adjustment programmes have been implemented in the country in response to the 
economic crisis. All of them emphasised the need of reforming the labour market in order to 
reduce labour costs, align wages with productivity and increase wage flexibility. According 
to the LABREF database of the European Commission, 159 labour market reforms were 
introduced between 2010 and 2017. Some of them were fundamental, e.g. National 
Minimum Wage cut, decentralisation of collective bargaining, increased working time 
flexibility, weakening employment protection laws, deregulation of occupational licensing 
etc. 
However, the effectiveness of those reforms in terms of delivering the desired level of wage 
flexibility remains unanswered. Using pre-2014 data, two studies provided evidence of a 
short-lived wage curve circa 2011 (Daouli et al., 2017; Cholezas and Kanellopoulos, 2015). 
Both studies attributed their findings to wage setting reforms, e.g. the collective bargaining 
framework restructuring and the National Minimum Wage cut. However, the strong 
recessionary trends of that period, the numerous reforms being concurrently implemented 
and the time needed before they bite did not allow for a clear answer to whether economic 
adjustment programmes delivered the desired wage flexibility. From a more technical 
perspective, both studies relied on cross-sectional data with wages being either reported in 
bands or imputed from other sources, still as band midpoints.  
This paper uses post-2016 data from the longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LFS) in which 
wages are reported continuously. According to the LABREF database, since the beginning of 
the economic adjustment programmes period, 86 percent and 80 percent of all labour 
market reforms (2010-2017) had been legislated and implemented before 2016, 
respectively (Figure 1). Hence, using better quality data after most of the major reforms 
have been implemented will provide a first picture regarding their effectiveness in terms of 
regional wage flexibility. 
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Figure 1. Labour market reforms during the economic adjustment programmes 
period in Greece. 
 
Source: LABREF database, European Commission 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The data source is the Greek quarterly LFS covering the period between 2016Q1 and 
2018Q4. Although a relatively short period (12 quarters), there is adequate local labour 
market variation as regional unemployment fell by nearly 4 percentage points during that 
period, on average. Unlike previous Greek studies, the longitudinal version of the LFS is 
available, allowing to follow individuals over time. The sample consists of non-agricultural 
private sector employees, aged between 15 and 65 years old and not enrolled in education. 
Wage curves are estimated using variants of the following model specification: log𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 log𝑈𝑟𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a continuous measure of the net hourly pay of individual i observed in region r 
at period t. Regional unemployment rate is measured by 𝑈𝑟𝑡. The 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 vector contains 
individual determinants of pay, i.e. gender, a second order polynomial in age, nationality, 
marital status, education, industry, occupation and work characteristics (part time, 
temporary job and workplace size). The terms 𝛼𝑖,  𝜆𝑟 and 𝜆𝑡 capture individual, region and 
time fixed effects, respectively. Finally 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error component. Equation (1) 
can be modified to omit individual fixed effects, or to control for lagged regional 
unemployment rates. Region refers to the 13 NUTS-2 regions. However, finer breakdowns 
are possible by splitting two major conurbations in Attica and Northern Greece (15 regions) 
and by distinguishing between urban and rural areas within each geographical entity (28 
regions). 
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Because it is difficult to control adequately for individual characteristics and regional wage 
pressure (migration, unobserved labour quality, amenities etc.) individual-level models are 
coupled with regional-level estimates obtained from a two-step analysis (Bell et al., 2002). In 
the first step, a valid wage measure that has been adjusted for individual composition 
effects is constructed. This can be done in two ways. The first one estimates a first-stage 
cross-section model for each time period, pooling together individuals across regions and 
controlling for region fixed effects: log𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟 + 𝜆𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 (2) 
In this case, parameters associated with individual characteristics are the same across 
regions but vary over time. However, they will be biased by any correlation between those 
characteristics and the unobserved individual heterogeneity. As an alternative, the second 
way makes use of the longitudinal nature of the LFS and estimates a first-stage panel model 
for each region: log𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡 (3) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the individual fixed-effect. In this case parameters are constant over time but 
vary with region. Also, they are not biased due to correlation between observed 
characteristics and individual effects. After estimating Equations (2) and (3), ?̂?𝑟𝑡 are used as 
dependent variables, i.e. the composition corrected regional wages, in the second stage: ?̂?𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾 log𝑈𝑟𝑡 + ?̂?𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝑡𝜑𝑟 + 𝜂𝑟𝑡 (4) 
 where region-time cells are the units of observation. Models control for logged regional 
unemployment rates (or their past realisation), time and region fixed effects, regional time 
trends and they can be extended to include wage dynamics. 
 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents individual-level results from Equation (1). Contemporaneous and one year 
(4 quarters) lagged regional unemployment rates are used. In IV estimates, current 
unemployment is instrumented with its one year lag (4 quarters). Panels A, B, and C report 
results using 13, 15 and 28 regions, respectively. All models are weighted using the survey 
weights and standard errors are clustered by region.  
Columns 1-3 do not account for individual fixed effects. They suggest the existence of a 
wage curve which, however, is flatter than the empirical law of -0.1; all estimates range 
between -.034 and -.054. Moreover, individual wages seem responsive to past rather than 
contemporaneous economic conditions.  
However, controlling for individual fixed effects (columns 4-6) suggests that the cross-
sectional wage curve slopes are overestimated. All parameters remain negative, but they 
are considerable lower and more precisely estimated. They imply a negative correlation 
between regional unemployment and unobserved labour quality and indicate that cross-
sectional relationships between wages and business cycle indicators are likely to suffer from 
composition bias. 
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Table 1. The wage curve elasticity: Individual-level results. 
 OLS OLS OLS-IV OLS-FE OLS-FE FE-IV 
Panel A: 13 regions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.003 (.012) - -.037*** 
(.013) 
-.001 (.005) - -.004 (.003) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.034** 
(.014) 
- - -.003 (.004) - 
F-test of excl. instr. - - 130.30 - - 114.14 
Panel B: 15 regions       log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.004 (.013) - -.040** (.016) -.004 (.005) - -.004 (.003) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.037** 
(.016) 
- - -.003 (.004) - 
F-test of excl. instr. - - 133.01 - - 127.47 
Panel C: 28 regions       log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.007 (.011) - -.054** (.025) -.005 (.005) - -.002 (.004) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.044** 
(.019) 
- - -.001 (.004) - 
F-test of excl. instr. - - 94.49 - - 202.59 
Individual 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,568 46,977 46,977 71,658 46,977 46,977 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT). 
Notes: Logged individual hourly wage is the dependent variable. Individual variables control for gender, age, 
nationality, marital status, education, industry, occupation, job and workplace characteristics. Time fixed effects 
contain year and quarter fixed effects. In IV models, log𝑈𝑟𝑡 is instrumented with its one year lag (log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4). Models 
are weighted using survey weights. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region. Asterisks ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 2 shows the results from the regional analysis. All models are weighted by the local 
population and include regional time trends in order to control for time-varying regional 
heterogeneity. In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is the composition-corrected wage 
from the first-stage cross-section model. The results are nearly identical with the individual-
level models indicating a weak wage curve relationship. However, the relationship 
disappears once the composition corrected wages from the first-stage panel are used 
(columns 5-8). Similar to Daouli et al. (2017) wages have a weak autoregressive nature 
(columns 4 and 8) but this is mostly due to the inclusion of the region-specific linear time 
trends. 
Despite the extensive institutional reforms, wages in Greece remain inflexible. The diffusion 
of decentralised bargaining remained rather limited and most firms that engage tend to 
adopt the National Minimum Wage provisions without much room for performance related 
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pay (Giannakopoulos and Laliotis, 2017). However, more emphasis on decentralised 
bargaining that fully incorporates firm-specific and local labour market conditions has been 
shown to generate locally flexible wages (Devicienti et al., 2008). 
Table 2. The wage curve elasticity: Regional-level results 
 Dependent variable: First-stage cross-section Dependent variable: First-stage panel 
 OLS-FE OLS-FE FE-IV FE-IV OLS-FE OLS-FE FE-IV FE-IV 
Panel A: 13 regions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.005  
(.011) 
- -.034*** 
(.010) 
-.031*** 
(.010) 
-.004 
(.006) 
- -.004 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.005) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.035**  
(.013) 
- - - -.004 
(.005) 
- - 
Lagged dependent   - .236** 
(.111) 
- - - .102 
(.247) 
F-test of excl. instr. - - 128.97 136.18 - - 128.97 125.05 
Observations 156 104 104 104 156 104 104 104 
Panel B: 15 regions         log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.006 
(.011) 
- -.034*** 
(.009) 
-.031*** 
(.009) 
-.004 
(.007) 
- -.004 
(.004) 
-.005 
(.004) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.035** 
(.012) 
- - - -.004 
(.004) 
- - 
Lagged dependent - - - .254*** 
(.091) 
- - - .080 
(.184) 
F-test excl. instr. - - 137.08 142.54 - - 137.08 135.52 
Observations 180 120 120 120 180 120 120 120 
Panel C: 28 regions         log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 -.001 
(.012) 
- -.048*** 
(.012) 
-.041*** 
(.012) 
-.009 
(.005) 
- -.006 
(.005) 
-.006 
(.005) log 𝑈𝑟𝑡−4  - -.044*** 
(.012) 
- - - -.006 
(.005) 
- - 
Lagged dependent - - - .259*** 
(.107) 
- - - .192** 
(.096) 
F-test of excl. instr. - - 158.50 165.33 - - 158.50 157.80 
Observations 336 224 224 224 336 224 224 224 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT). 
Notes: Composition-corrected regional wages from Equations (2) and (3) are the dependent variables. Time fixed 
effects contain year and quarter fixed effects. In IV models, log𝑈𝑟𝑡  is instrumented with its one year lag (log𝑈𝑟𝑡−4). 
Models are weighted using the local population. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region. Asterisks 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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4. Conclusions 
Using recent longitudinal LFS data (2016Q1-2018Q4) does not support the existence of a 
Greek wage curve. Any statistically significant cross-sectional estimates disappear once 
individual unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. After several waves of labour 
market reforms since 2010, wages in Greece remain irresponsive to local labour market 
conditions. If regional wage flexibility is the target, more emphasis on a decentralised wage 
setting process is needed.  
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